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IS  CONGRESS  HOLDING  ITSELF  TO  ACCOUNT?
ADDRESSING  CONGRESS’S  SEXUAL
HARASSMENT  PROBLEM  AND  THE
CONGRESSIONAL  ACCOUNTABILITY
ACT  OF  1995  REFORM  ACT
Christina C. Hopke*
It’s a boy’s club . . . . I think that a lot of things are just understood and you’ve got to play
by the rules and keep quiet about it.  That’s just kind of the mentality, from my experience.  And
so, I feel like the feedback that was given to me was: If I wouldn’t stay quiet and fall in line, then
my career was over. . . . I was told right away that I would be, quote-unquote, “blackballed” if I
came forward. . . . That’s exactly what happened.
—Lauren Greene, former aide to former Representative Blake Farenthold
(R-Texas), on the effect of coming forward with claims of sexual harass-
ment and discrimination against her former boss; a decision that led to
the “implo[sion]” of her entire political career after five years of “climbing
the Capitol Hill ladder.”1
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2020; Bachelor of Arts in
Political Science, Honors and Communications Studies, Gustavus Adolphus College, 2015.
I would like to thank Professor Jennifer Mason McAward for her guidance and advice on
this Note, Professor Elizabeth White Dietz for her helpful comments and support
throughout the writing process, and the staff of the Notre Dame Law Review for their
thoughtful edits and camaraderie.  Most of all, I thank my steadfast husband for his
unending encouragement and always optimistic perspective; my parents for the many
sacrifices they made to give life to my dreams; and my family for their constant love and
support.  Lastly, I dedicate this Note to my newborn son, Clayton Glen, who has given new
meaning to all that I do—diving into motherhood while this Note was in its final stages was
a challenge I’d happily accept many times over.  All errors are my own.
1 Rachael Bade, A Congressman’s Accuser: Blackballed and Baby-Sitting for Cash, POLITICO
(Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/04/blake-farenthold-sexual-ha
rass-greene-278869 (quoting Lauren Greene).
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly half of working women in the United States say they have exper-
ienced harassment in the workplace.2  Research also shows that women in
male-dominated work environments are sexually harassed more than women
in gender-balanced or in female-dominated work environments.3  Congress
certainly cannot be described as a female-dominated or even a gender-bal-
anced work environment.  Of the 535 elected representatives of the 115th
Congress, only 110 positions were held by women—just twenty-one percent.4
Among congressional staffers, while it appears that roughly half of the total
positions are filled by women, there is a vast disparity between the number of
women in positions of authority as opposed to the number of men holding
those positions5: men dominate in positions of authority,6 while women are
overwhelmingly represented in administrative or constituent-services posi-
tions.7  In terms of both elected officials and the staff they hire, it is evident
that there is either an imbalance of female presence altogether or that there
is an imbalance of female power even when women are present, as the female
staff hired are most often constrained to low-level positions.  The combina-
tion of this imbalance of the sexes, the unique environment of power sur-
rounding the halls of Congress, and the vital role that congressional
employment plays for young professionals striving to achieve a career in
national politics, fosters a culture in which harassment can easily occur,
remain unreported, and go systematically unpunished.
2 Carrie Dann, NBC/WSJ Poll: Nearly Half of Working Women Say They’ve Experienced Har-
assment, NBC NEWS (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/nbc-wsj-
poll-nearly-half-working-women-say-they-ve-n815376.
3 Jennifer L. Berdahl, The Sexual Harassment of Uppity Women, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
425, 427 (2007).
4 Women in Congress 2018, CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN & POL., http://www.cawp.
rutgers.edu/women-us-congress-2018 (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).  The number of female
representatives rose to a record-breaking 127 women after the November 2018 elections
ushered in a historic 116th Congress.  Rachel Cohen et al., 116th Congress Breaks Records for
Women, Minority Lawmakers, HILL (Jan. 9, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/
424449-116th-congress-breaks-records-for-women-minority-lawmakers.  Even still, female
representation in the House and Senate comprises less than twenty-five percent of our
federal representatives. Id.
5 Among Senior Capitol Hill Staffers, Men Still Outnumber Women, NAT’L J., https://www.
nationaljournal.com/s/627930/among-senior-capitol-hill-staffers-men-still-outnumber-
women (last visited Nov. 17, 2018); Casey Burgat, Among House Staff, Women Are Well Repre-
sented. Just Not in the Senior Positions., WASH. POST (June 20, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/20/among-house-staff-women-are-well-repre
sented-just-not-in-the-senior-positions/?utm_term=.7c0c42411f9a.
6 Examples of positions with high levels of authority include chiefs of staff, deputy
chiefs of staff, legislative directors, and legislative correspondents.  Burgat, supra note 6.
7 Examples of positions with low or no authority are office managers, schedulers, con-
stituent service representatives, and congressional aides. Id.  Just thirty-three percent of
chief of staff positions, the highest position in congressional staffing, are held by women.
Id.  Meanwhile ninety-five percent of the lowest position in congressional staffing, office
manager positions, are held by women. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL511.txt unknown Seq: 3  1-JUL-19 14:01
2019] addressing  congress’s  sexual  harassment  problem 2161
Since the ‘me too’ Movement’s infiltration into the congressional work-
place, various members of Congress have been quoted in their belief that “as
Members of Congress we must hold ourselves to a higher standard.”8  Yet the
deluge of sexual harassment claims pouring out from past and present con-
gressional employees makes clear that Congress has not been holding itself
to a higher standard.9  Leaving aside the question of whether elected repre-
sentatives should be held to a higher standard than the general public, Con-
gress has set that bar for itself, and the American people should expect its
members to meet it.  There were quick calls to reform the Congressional
Accountability Act of 1995 (“CAA”)10 following the wave of public allegations
of harassment occurring in Congress.11  In response, both houses passed
their own reform bills and then spent months trying to negotiate between the
two.12  Finally, more than a year later, the public received an answer from its
representatives as to how they expected to live up to a “higher standard”: the
8 Press Release, Comm. on House Admin., House Passes Resolution Mandating Anti-
Harassment, Anti-Discrimination Training Requirements (Nov. 29, 2017), https://cha.
house.gov/press-release/house-passes-resolution-mandating-anti-harassment-anti-discrim
ination-training; see also Jessica Taylor, Under Fire for Alleged Sexual Harassment, Texas Rep.
Blake Farenthold Resigns, NPR (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/06/
600343808/under-fire-for-alleged-sexual-harassment-texas-rep-blake-farenthold-resigns.
9 Letter from 1500 Former Congressional Staff, to the Speaker & Minority Leader of
the U.S. House of Representatives, the Majority and Minority Leaders of the U.S. Senate,
the Chairman & Ranking Member of the Senate Comm. on Rules & Admin. & the Chair-
man & Ranking Member of the Comm. on House Admin. (Nov. 13, 2017), https://drive.
google.com/file/d/1qO5r8yJ3USjWb9tZamBgjn5KtJMTDQ8I/view [hereinafter Letter
from 1500 Former Congressional Staff]; see also Anna Kain, Opinion, I’m Sharing My
#MeToo Story Because Congress Is Broken, and We Have to Fix It, WASH. POST (May 7, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/congress—your-metoo-moment-is-now/2018
/05/07/286eac10-48b1-11e8-8b5a-3b1697adcc2a_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term
=.901a6ebe6be7; MJ Lee et al., ‘Nothing About It Felt Right’: More than 50 People Describe Sexual
Harassment on Capitol Hill, CNN (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/14/poli
tics/sexual-harassment-congress/index.html.
10 The CAA outlines the employment laws that apply to Congress and includes
prohibitions on sex discrimination and sexual harassment. See infra Part III for detailed
discussion of the CAA.
11 See Karen Handel & Jackie Walorski, Opinion, Congress Needs to Take the Lead on
Fighting Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, HILL (Nov. 30, 2017), https://thehill.com/
blogs/congress-blog/politics/362563-congress-needs-to-take-the-lead-on-fighting-sexual-
harassment-in; MJ Lee & Sunlen Serfaty, Growing Calls for Reforms to Sexual Harassment Poli-
cies in Congress, CNN (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/07/politics/sexual-
harassment-congress-policy/index.html; see also Letter from 1500 Former Congressional
Staff, supra note 9.
12 Leigh Ann Caldwell, Time Is Running out for a Divided Congress to Finish Its #MeToo
Legislation, NBC NEWS (July 27, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/time-
running-out-divided-congress-finish-its-metoo-legislation-n894966; Frida Garza, The House
and the Senate Can’t Agree on Whose Proposed Sexual Harassment Reform Is Better, JEZEBEL (July
27, 2018), https://theslot.jezebel.com/the-house-and-the-senate-cant-agree-on-whose-pro
posed-s-1827920773.
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Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 Reform Act (“Reform Act”).13  Yet,
it is not clear that the reform amounts to true accountability.  The Reform
Act is considered by many to be only “an important step” in the right direc-
tion—not a resounding victory.14  It represents a watered-down version of
what the House had hoped to accomplish,15 and falls short of the reform
needed to really ensure that Congress holds itself to a higher standard when
it comes to preventing and correcting sex discrimination and harassment
within its halls.
This Note explores how the CAA contributed to the underreporting of
the sexual harassment occurring in Congress and evaluates both the original
proposals offered by the House and Senate to reform the CAA and the
Reform Act in its final form.  Part I will offer brief background information
on the ‘me too’ Movement and the specific allegations of harassment against
individuals in Congress.  Part II will explore the issue of underreporting
when it comes to instances of sexual harassment, with a particular focus on
reporting considerations of professional women such as those employed in
the legislature.  Part III gives an overview of Title VII, the basic framework for
making a formal complaint for sexual harassment or discrimination that
occurs in the employment setting.  Part III then largely focuses on the CAA
and how it modified the procedure required to bring claims of sexual harass-
ment or discrimination occurring within the congressional context.  Part IV
is broken into three Sections.  Section IV.A describes the major components
of the initial House and Senate reform bills and how they compare to one
another and to the Reform Act.  Section IV.B covers the major components
of the Reform Act.  Section IV.C then explores the ways in which the Reform
Act falls short of what victims of sexual harassment on Capitol Hill deserve
and fails to meet Congress’s promise to hold itself to a higher standard.
I. ‘ME TOO’: THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT EXPOSES CONGRESS’S SEXUAL
HARASSMENT PROBLEM
Though it did not garner national attention until 2017, the ‘me too’
Movement was founded in 2006 to build a community for survivors of sexual
violence, particularly for women and girls of color in low-income communi-
ties.16  The Movement garnered national attention due to a viral hashtag
13 Pub. L. No. 115-397, 132 Stat. 5297 (2018) (to be codified in scattered sections of 2
U.S.C.).
14 Li Zhou, Congress’s Recently Passed Sexual Harassment Bill, Explained, VOX (Dec. 20,
2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/12/20/18138377/congress-sexual-harassment-bill
(acknowledging that lawmakers and advocates believe the law is just the beginning and
there is “still more work to be done”); see also Kelsey Snell, Congress to Make Members Pay Out
of Pocket for Sexual Harassment Settlements, NPR (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/
12/12/676209258/congress-to-make-members-pay-out-of-pocket-for-sexual-harassment-set
tlements (noting that the law “falls short of the sweeping changes” that were hoped for).
15 See Snell, supra note 14.
16 History & Vision, METOO., https://metoomvmt.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 21,
2018).  Though the Movement’s purpose is to build community, founder Tarana Burke
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born in the wake of successive allegations of sexual harassment against high-
profile men in Hollywood in October 2017, including claims against Harvey
Weinstein and Roy Price.17  With just one tweet, actress Alyssa Milano ele-
vated the grassroots ‘me too’ Movement to a national platform.18  Before the
end of the month, public allegations were brought forward against dozens
more men: actors, CEOs, celebrities, directors, publishers, photographers,
and journalists.19  In November 2017, the wave of ‘me too’ allegations
reached politics, first with Senate candidate Roy Moore20 and then with Sen-
can trace the spark of ‘me too’ to a single encounter she had with one young girl more
than a decade ago at a youth camp at which she was working. The Inception, METOO.,
https://metoomvmt.org/the-inception/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2018).
17 See Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accus-
ers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/har
vey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&click
Source=story-heading&modulea-lede-package-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news;
John Koblin, Roy Price Quits Amazon Studios After Sexual Harassment Claim, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/business/media/roy-price-amazon-stu-
dios.html. Some historical accounts of the ‘me too’ Movement also consider the forced
resignation of Fox News’s Bill O’Reilly in April 2017 to be an integral first step for the
Movement. See Celebrities, Politicians, CEOs, and Others Who Have Been Accused of Sexual Mis-
conduct Since April 2017, VOX, https://www.vox.com/a/sexual-harassment-assault-allega-
tions-list/ (last updated Jan. 9, 2019) (documenting a compilation of influential people
accused of sexual misconduct since O’Reilly’s forced resignation).  Many timelines do not
include the earlier case of sexual harassment brought by former Fox & Friends host Gret-
chen Carlson against Fox News surrounding the conduct of Roger Ailes and Steve Doocy,
yet the impact of the case on preparing the public stage onto which the ‘me too’ Move-
ment entered should not be discounted. See Gretchen Carlson, Opinion, To Succeed,
#MeToo Must Target America’s Laws, Not Just a Few Powerful Men, USA TODAY (Sept. 25, 2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/voices/2018/09/25/me-too-anniversary-wo
men-sexual-harassment-gretchen-carlson-column/1381126002/; Judd Legum, The Forgotten
Sexual Harassment Scandal at Fox News, THINK PROGRESS (Apr. 24, 2017) https://thinkpro-
gress.org/the-forgotten-sexual-harassment-scandal-at-fox-news-5f7e8ccb5083/. For what is
thus far the most complete compilation of allegations and their subsequent impact
throughout the “year of reckoning” after the Weinstein allegations, see Lisa Ryan, Our Year
of Reckoning: An Exhaustive Timeline, CUT (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.thecut.com/2018/
10/sexual-harassment-harvey-weinstein-allegations.html.
18 See Sarah Spellings, #MeToo Hashtag Shows Just How Common Sexual Assault and Har-
assment Are, CUT (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.thecut.com/2017/10/metoo-shows-preva
lence-of-sexual-harassment.html; Alyssa Milano (@Alyssa_Milano), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017,
1:21 PM), https://twitter.com/Alyssa_Milano/status/919659438700670976.  Milano’s
tweet—“If you’ve been sexually harassed or assaulted write ‘me too’ as a reply to this
tweet.”—received 35,000 responses on just the first day.  Spellings, supra.
19 Ryan, supra note 17.
20 See Stephanie McCrummen et al., Woman Says Roy Moore Initiated Sexual Encounter




\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL511.txt unknown Seq: 6  1-JUL-19 14:01
2164 notre dame law review [vol. 94:5
ator Al Franken.21  In the year that followed, public allegations were made
against eleven U.S. representatives and against the chiefs of staff for two addi-
tional representatives.22  In both claims against the chiefs of staff, the respec-
tive representatives were accused of failing to take any action to address the
sexual harassment despite having knowledge of the conduct.23  Not only
were claims made against representatives by congressional staff or members
of the public, allegations of sexual harassment were also brought forward
against unidentified congressmen by four congresswomen.24  While three of
the congresswomen no longer served in Congress, the harassment occurred
while they were in office.25  Beyond allegations directed at specific members
of Congress or particular members of their staff, dozens more allegations
have been made by staffers declining to publicly identify the perpetrators by
name.26  These staffers disclosed that incidents of harassment occurred at
the hands of both members of Congress and their senior aides.27
Despite these many allegations, it is difficult to get a sense of how fre-
quently sexual harassment occurs on the Hill.  The best resource available to
get even a tentative feel for the frequency at which sexual harassment occurs
within the halls of Congress seems to be the annual reports produced by the
21 See Dartunorro Clark, Al Franken Accused of Forcibly Kissing, Groping Leeann Tweeden,
NBC NEWS (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/sen-al-franken-
accused-forcibly-kissing-groping-woman-n821381; Meghan Keneally, Sen. Al Franken’s Accus-
ers and Their Allegations Against Him, ABC NEWS (Dec. 6, 2017), https://abcnews.go.com/
US/sen-al-frankens-accusers-accusations-made/story?id=51406862.  It is also important to
note that public allegations by congressional employees of sexual harassment perpetrated
by congressmen predate the ‘me too’ Movement; for example, there were allegations
against Representative Mark Foley in 2006, Representative Eric Massa in 2010, and Repre-
sentative Blake Farenthold in 2015. See Erin Bacon, Predatory Behavior: The Dark Side of
Capitol Hill, ROLL CALL (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.rollcall.com/news/predatory-behavior-
capitol-hill-sexual-harassment.
22 See Ann Gerhart & Danielle Rindler, How #MeToo Has Changed the D.C. Power Struc-
ture—So Far, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/
2018/politics/how-metoo-has-changed-the-dc-power-structure/?utm_term=.d4ab5436c98e.
23 See id.; see also Elise Viebeck, Conn. Congresswoman Kept Aide on Staff for 3 Months After




24 Associated Press, Congresswomen Say They’ve Been Repeatedly Sexual Harassed by Col-
leagues, FORTUNE (Nov. 3, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/11/03/sexual-harassment-con
gress/.
25 Id.
26 See Lee et al., supra note 9.  Fear of retaliation is often the most prominent reason
why accusers remain anonymous; for a discussion of why this concern is particularly signifi-
cant when allegations are made against a political figure, see infra Part II.  Many of the
staffers declining to publicly name their perpetrators have also remained anonymous
themselves for fear of retaliation and repercussions. See Lee et al., supra note 9.
27 See Lee et al., supra note 9.
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Office of Compliance (OOC).28  These reports provide breakdowns of how
many allegations of sexual harassment and discrimination are occurring each
calendar year.  The OOC reports for 2017 and 2016 indicate that seventeen
and nineteen congressional employees initiated claims of sexual harassment
and discrimination in each of those years, respectively.29  These annual num-
bers should be concerning all on their own, however, they are even more
alarming because of the well-known problem of underreporting when it
comes to sexual misconduct.30  The likelihood that the OOC reports signifi-
cantly underrepresent the actual occurrence of harassment on the Hill is
underscored by the findings of a CQ Roll Call survey of congressional staff in
July 2016.  The survey found that forty percent of female respondents
believed sexual harassment to be a problem on Capitol Hill.31  One in six of
the respondents reported being personally victimized during her employ-
ment by the legislature.32  Based on the number of female staffers employed
by Congress and these survey results, it is quite likely that the OOC reports
grossly understate the number of sexual harassment incidents occurring
within the halls of Congress.33
28 The Office of Compliance is the legislative office established under the CAA to
enforce workplace protections for congressional employees.
29 U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE, FY2017 ANNUAL REPORT: STATE OF THE CONGRES-
SIONAL WORKPLACE 11 (2017); U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE, FY2016 ANNUAL REPORT:
STATE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL WORKPLACE 18 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 STATE OF THE CON-
GRESSIONAL WORKPLACE].  Though the 2015 Report does not identify how many claims
were initiated for sexual harassment and discrimination specifically, forty-nine claims were
initiated that year for Title VII and discrimination allegations, which would include allega-
tions of sexual harassment and discrimination. U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE, FY2015
ANNUAL REPORT: STATE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL WORKPLACE 19 (2015).  The 2014 Report
identifies that sixty information requests were made for concerns of sexual harassment and
discrimination that year, and that twenty-six claims were actually initiated for sexual harass-
ment and discrimination allegations in 2014. U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE, FY2014
ANNUAL REPORT: STATE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL WORKPLACE 21, 24 (2014) [hereinafter 2014
STATE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL WORKPLACE].  Title VII and discrimination concerns com-
posed almost fifty percent of the general information requests received by the OOC in
2013, and thirty-seven claims were initiated for allegations of sexual harassment and dis-
crimination that year. U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE, FY2013 ANNUAL REPORT: STATE
OF THE CONGRESSIONAL WORKPLACE 20, 24 (2013).  The reports for the last several years
also consistently indicate that claims of harassment and discrimination under Title VII and
other discrimination statutes are frequently the most common workplace violations for
which the OOC receives requests for general information and for which proceedings are
initiated (as compared to the other workplace statutes that the OOC is charged with
enforcing under the CAA).
30 See infra Part II.
31 Bacon, supra note 21.
32 Id.
33 If nearly half of congressional staffing positions are filled by women (disregarding
the disparity in men holding a significant proportion of positions of authority as opposed
to women), then there are some 7000 or so women employed by Congress. See Burgat,
supra note 5; see also Among Senior Capitol Hill Staffers, Men Still Outnumber Women, supra note
5.  If one out of every six women is personally subjected to sexual harassment and discrimi-
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While the nation began to question the CAA reporting procedure for
congressional employees in the fall of 2017, a significant number of congres-
sional staffers, either current or former, also spoke out against the
pre–Reform Act reporting process.  Less than one month after ‘me too’
arrived on the national scene, more than 1500 former congressional staff
came together to sign a single letter encouraging Congress to take action and
make meaningful change.34  The signatories were not necessarily individuals
representing themselves as survivors of sexual harassment or discrimination
during their employment with the legislature.  Rather, those who signed the
letter were individuals urging reform due to a recognition that the problem
of harassment is significant and the process for bringing claims forward
under the CAA was “inadequate” and may have “actually [been] dis-
courag[ing] victims” from coming forward.35  This adds to the conclusion
that the OOC reports fail to capture the depth of Congress’s harassment
problem: if so few actual reports are being made while so many current or
former staffers report having experienced harassment, and many more criti-
cize the inadequacy  of the pre–Reform Act reporting process, then it would
be a severe mistake to accept the OOC reported numbers of harassment alle-
gations at face value.
II. THE REPORTING PROBLEM: WHY SOME VICTIMS CHOOSE NOT TO REPORT
Victims of sexual violence and harassment may have a renewed sense
that they are not alone as a result of the ‘me too’ Movement.  This sense of
support, however, does not necessarily result in an automatic increase in the
number of reports being made of the sexual misconduct that is occurring.
Underreporting is a well-known epidemic when it comes to sexual miscon-
duct.36  Though this theme is not at all particular to sexual misconduct in the
employment setting, this Part focuses solely on underreporting of sexual mis-
conduct in the workplace in light of the scope of this Note.
“[T]he least common response to harassment is . . . to take some formal
action, either to report the harassment internally or file a formal legal com-
plaint.”37  In many cases, victims of harassment in the workplace do not com-
nation as per the findings of the CQ Roll Call survey, then the recent reports should reflect
a number closer to 1000 or more claims of sexual harassment experienced by the congres-
sional staffers polled in 2016. See Bacon, supra note 21.
34 Letter from 1500 Former Congressional Staff, supra note 9.
35 Id.
36 Lilia M. Cortina & Jennifer L. Berdahl, Sexual Harassment in Organizations: A Decade
of Research in Review, in 1 THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 469, 484
(Julian Barling & Cary L. Cooper eds., 2008) (citing various works discussing
underreporting).
37 Preventing Sexual Harassment in the Congressional Workplace: Examining Reforms to the
Congressional Accountability Act: Hearing Before the Comm. on H. Admin., 115th Cong. 8 (2017)
[hereinafter Preventing Sexual Harassment Hearing] (statement of Victoria A. Lipnic, Acting
Chair, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
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plain or formally confront the harasser.38  Less than a third of people
harassed at work will report it to a supervisor, and less than fifteen percent
will file a formal complaint.39  There are myriad reasons why victims of sex
discrimination and harassment in the workplace might not report the mis-
conduct.  An initial obstacle to reporting is that victims must first know their
rights in order to know that those rights have been violated.  Victims must
also know or have access to information on the procedure for making a com-
plaint.  Even when a victim knows how to make a claim, they might choose
not to report out of fear of being blamed for the incident or not being
believed.40  There is also fear that, once reported, an employer will be indif-
ferent to the harassment, will frame the problem as the victim being oversen-
sitive, or, even worse, that the employer will be hostile to the victim’s
report.41  Further, victims might not report due to fear of retaliation from
the employer and also from the harasser themselves.42  Essentially, victims
risk that reporting the conduct will make the problem worse.  Victims also
fear that complaints will not be kept confidential.43  Where confidentiality is
in question, victims may fear facing a lack of support from coworkers, or even
backlash from them for disrupting the workplace environment.44
Additionally, it is not uncommon for victims to put up with certain con-
duct in the moment, either because they do not know how to respond or
because they feel little choice but to accept the behavior after weighing the
above concerns.45  Victims also might not come to recognize the incident as
sexual harassment until confiding in others, hearing stories of others who
experienced similar conduct, or looking back on the incident later.46
Beyond these considerations which may be shared by all victims of work-
place misconduct, the setting of Capitol Hill adds compounding factors to
the underreporting that surrounds sexual misconduct in the workplace.
38 See CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 15 (2016).
39 See Claire Cain Miller, It’s Not Just Fox: Why Women Don’t Report Sexual Harassment,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/upshot/its-not-just-
fox-why-women-dont-report-sexual-harassment.html.
40 See Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’ Rights Consciousness and the Construc-
tion of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 83, 87 (2005).
41 See id. at 87, 100–01.
42 See id. at 87; Heather McLaughlin et al., The Economic and Career Effects of Sexual
Harassment on Working Women, 31 GENDER & SOC’Y 333, 346 (2017).  “People worry a great
deal about retaliation when they bring forth these kinds of claims.”  Bacon, supra note 21
(quoting federal employment lawyer Richard Salzman).
43 See Marshall, supra note 40, at 87.
44 “[W]hen a complaint is made, often times [the] complainant becomes an outsider,
a troublemaker . . . .” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Jennie Kihnley, Unraveling the
Ivory Fabric: Institutional Obstacles to the Handling of Sexual Harassment Complaints, 25 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 69, 80 (2000); see also McLaughlin et al., supra note 42, at 348–49 (describing
how refusing to engage in misogynistic culture, even short of actually making a report of
harassment, can cause one to be seen as a poor team player).
45 See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 40, at 101.
46 Russell A. Jackson, Into the Light, INTERNAL AUDITOR, June 2018, at 20, 22.
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Congress is the place where young political minds go to try to make a
difference:
In every building, down every hallway, and behind every door in Congress
are good, honest, people—often young people—working long hours for lit-
tle pay in hopes of making our country and the world fairer and more just.
And they have chosen to do so for and with you.  It is impossible to describe
how meaningful it is to work there.47
Legislative staffers entering the workforce for the first time are a “particularly
vulnerable population.”48  In particular, they face unique considerations of
loyalty and allegiance to the office and the congressperson for whom they
work,49 the party to which their boss belongs,50 and to the country as a
whole.51  Beyond this is an awareness that staffer positions are the basic train-
ing ground for those desiring to pursue a political career.52  “[I]n every
instance, [their] current jobs and future careers in politics [are] integrally
tied to [their] willingness to stay quiet.”53  “There is a sense that going for-
ward with an allegation . . . would be completely the end of any career work-
ing for anybody on the Hill—and it undoubtedly would be.”54
47 Letter from Former Congressional Staffers, to the Speaker & Minority Leader of the
U.S. House of Representatives and the Majority & Minority Leaders of the U.S. Senate
(Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/letter_
from_former_hill_staffers_who_are_survivors_of_harassment_and_assault-final-_9-20-18.
pdf [hereinafter Letter Regarding Harassment, Discrimination, and Reform in Congress].
48 Preventing Sexual Harassment Hearing, supra note 37, at 20 (statement of Susan Tsui
Grundmann, Executive Director, Congressional Office of Compliance); see also Kain, supra
note 10 (“As a 24-year-old in my first professional job, I mistook survival for complicity and
suffering for weakness.”).
49 Kain, supra note 9.
50 Bacon, supra note 21.
51 “The halls of Congress are filled with wide-eyed young people who are excited and
honored to serve in that exalted place.”  Kain, supra note 9.  “We are former congressional
staffers who, like so many before us and since, arrived on Capitol Hill with big dreams and
excited to be a part of the improbable story of America.”  Letter Regarding Harassment,
Discrimination, and Reform in Congress, supra note 47.
52 Lee et al., supra note 9 (“‘A lot of it has to do with being in a place where people
who have power try to exert it to get what they want.’ . . . [S]ome women tolerate the
advances or even reciprocate them . . . believing that it is one way to climb the ladder. . . .
‘If a part of getting ahead on Capitol Hill is playing ball with whatever douchebag—then
whatever.’”).
53 Letter Regarding Harassment, Discrimination, and Reform in Congress, supra note
47; see also Bacon, supra note 21 (“[P]eople working on Capitol Hill know that making a
complaint ‘is career-ending.’” (quoting D.C. employment lawyer Debra Katz who repre-
sents congressional aides in sexual harassment cases)).
54 Michelle Ye Hee Lee & Elise Viebeck, How Congress Plays by Different Rules on Sexual
Harassment and Misconduct, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/how-congress-plays-by-different-rules-on-sexual-harassment-and-misconduct/
2017/10/26/2b9a8412-b80c-11e7-9e58-e6288544af98_story.html (quoting D.C. employ-
ment lawyer Debra Katz); see also Bade, supra note 1 (reporting on the consequences for
former aide Lauren Greene, whose political career “imploded” after she reported the har-
assment and discrimination of her boss—former Representative Blake Farenthold; as a
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A legislative employee might also be concerned about their exposure in
bringing a claim forward, both financially and socially.55  If an employee feels
that they are unable to bear the burden of possible litigation without assis-
tance in the process of investigating or prosecuting the claim, then it will be
difficult for them to decide to bring the claim forward.56  Under the CAA,
aggrieved employees were not provided counsel; thus, if an employee wanted
representation in their claim against a powerful perpetrator, this added to
the already significant burden victims had to bear.  Whether, and to what
extent, the Reform Act addresses this particular consideration is discussed in
Part IV of this Note.  In addition to the costs associated with obtaining repre-
sentation, employees might also factor in the social costs unique to making
these kinds of allegations against public figures.  The social costs seem likely
to be magnified when combined with the lifelong ramifications reporting can
have on one’s political career.57
Ultimately, there are many considerations that weigh against a victim’s
consideration to bring their claim forward, some of which are unique to the
setting of working in the legislature.  Beyond the underreporting of work-
place sexual misconduct across all employment sectors, legislative employees
face additional concerns that make it more likely that underreporting is at
least equally as common in the congressional setting as compared to other
employment sectors, if not more so.  There is “no doubt that sexual harass-
ment is underreported in Congress, just as all workplace infractions are
underreported in Congress.”58  The discouraging hurdle of trying to navigate
the reporting process for congressional employees under the CAA was itself a
part of this problem: “Few staffers seem[ed] aware of their rights or the har-
assment reporting process.”59  Employment attorneys in D.C. who work with
congressional employees bringing harassment and discrimination cases agree
that the lack of awareness of workplace rights and the reporting process is
concerning: “A lot of people are confused about it.  We’ll get calls from peo-
ple who work down on the Hill, and they’re not all that clear as to what they
should be doing.”60  The CQ Roll Call survey found that ninety percent of
result, Greene’s political career is over, she has found work only through temporary jobs
and babysitting on the side and has had to depend on family for support while applying to
“dozens, if not more than a hundred, jobs in communications”).
55 See Preventing Sexual Harassment Hearing, supra note 37, at 20 (statement of Susan
Tsui Grundmann, Executive Director, Office of Compliance).
56 See Lee & Viebeck, supra note 54.
57 Id.; see also Bade, supra note 1 (highlighting Lauren Greene’s personal experience
with a struggling career after reporting due to the political and social ramifications).
58 Lee & Viebeck, supra note 54 (quoting CEO of the Congressional Management
Foundation Brad Fitch).  The Congressional Management Foundation is a nonprofit
organization that aims to help lawmakers and staff make their offices more transparent,
accountable, and effective by strengthening connections with constituents. About CMF,
CONG. MGMT. FOUND., http://www.congressfoundation.org/about-cmf (last visited Nov.
21, 2018).
59 Lee & Viebeck, supra note 54.
60 Id. (quoting D.C. employment lawyer Alan Lescht).
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staffers were unaware of the Office of Compliance, the legislative office
charged with enforcing workplace protections for congressional employ-
ees.61  The original CAA procedure required that an aggrieved employee go
through the OOC in order to make any kind of claim, either administrative
or judicial—thus, an employee who did not know that the OOC existed was
an employee completely unable to vindicate any violation of their workplace
rights, including being subjected to harassing or discriminatory conduct.
III. ILLEGALITY OF SEX DISCRIMINATION AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
WORKPLACE: TITLE VII, THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, AND HOW CONGRESS PLAYS BY DIFFERENT RULES
Sex discrimination in the workplace was made illegal by Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.62  Title VII made it unlawful for an employer (1) “to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex;” or
(2) “to limit, segregate, or classify employees or applicants . . . in any way
which would . . . adversely affect” an employee or applicant as a result of their
sex.63  The bill was initially intended to address racial discrimination in
employment. Indeed, the word “sex” was actually added by Senator Howard
W. Smith of Virginia in an attempt to block passage of the bill.64  Though the
ploy clearly did not prevent passage of the bill, it does help to explain why—
despite the inclusion of sex in Title VII—sexual harassment was not recog-
nized as a cause of action under Title VII until over twenty years later in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.65  In Meritor, the Supreme Court finally made
clear that claims of harassment were cognizable under Title VII.66  Even still,
workplace sexual harassment claims were rare until 1991.67
61 Bacon, supra note 21.
62 Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–716, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (1964) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-16 (2012)).
63 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
64 BETH K. WHITTENBURY, INVESTIGATING THE WORKPLACE HARASSMENT CLAIM 2 (2012).
65 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
66 Id. at 65–67.
67 WHITTENBURY, supra note 64, at 2.  Some scholars correlate this timeline to the
claims of sexual harassment by Anita Hill against then-nominee to the U.S. Supreme
Court, Clarence Thomas. Id.  Still, accounts of women’s experience with workplace sexual
harassment were recognized much earlier. See, e.g., LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB (1978); ANNA-MARIA MARSHALL, CONFRONTING
SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EVERYDAY LIFE 36 (2005) (documenting the
initial inclusion of sexual harassment as a political issue within national women’s organiza-
tions in the 1970s).  Of course, it would be incomplete not to mention Catharine MacKin-
non’s contribution to the development of sexual harassment law as well. CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
(1979).
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Sexual harassment law developed into two different types of cognizable
claims: hostile environment and quid pro quo.68  A hostile environment
claim requires that some sexual conduct occurred,69 such conduct was
unwelcome, and that the conduct was so severe or pervasive as to create a
hostile working environment.70  A quid pro quo claim requires that some
sexual conduct occurred, such conduct was unwelcome, and that failure to
submit to the conduct was used as a basis for an employment decision affect-
ing the individual’s employment status.71  Employees covered by the law72
have the choice of pursuing a claim internally under their company’s policies
and procedures or making a claim to the U.S. Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (“EEOC”), the executive agency charged with enforcing
workplace protections for executive employees as well as other public and
private employees.73  However, none of the protections of Title VII initially
applied to Congress or any employee under its authority74: when enacting
Title VII, Congress exempted itself from the statute’s workplace protections.
The EEOC was created as part of Title VII.75  The EEOC’s procedure for
handling claims of sexual harassment or discrimination requires an
aggrieved employee to file a “charge of discrimination” within 180 days of the
harassing or discriminatory conduct.76  The EEOC will then notify the
employer of the claim.  The EEOC may request that the parties engage in
mediation, but mediation is strictly voluntary; it will only occur if all parties
consent to participate.77  Where mediation does not occur or does not
resolve the charge, the EEOC will engage in investigation of the charge.78
Investigation can include conducting interviews and collecting documents
from the employer; where employers do not cooperate, the EEOC has sub-
poena power to ensure their compliance.79  After concluding its investiga-
68 Quid pro quo is Latin for “something for something.”
69 This conduct can be either differential treatment based on sex or conduct that is
sexual in nature. WHITTENBURY, supra note 64, at 3.
70 Id.; see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
71 WHITTENBURY, supra note 64, at 8.  A variety of actions can constitute the necessary
“employment decision,” including “hiring/firing, promotion/demotion, change of shift
assignment, change of job description, change of job location, change in benefits, change
in compensation, [and] significant change of work area.” Id. at 9.
72 Most employees working for an employer with fifteen or more employees will be
covered by Title VII’s sex discrimination protection. About EEOC: Overview, EEOC, https:/
/www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 30, 2018).  This includes employees of
the federal government except for employees of the legislative branch. Id.
73 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2012).
74 Id. § 2000e(b).
75 Id. § 2000e-4.
76 Employees & Applicants: Time Limits for Filing a Charge, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/
employees/timeliness.cfm (last visited Nov. 30, 2018).
77 About EEOC: Questions and Answers About Mediation, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/mediation/qanda.cfm (last visited Nov. 30, 2018).
78 Employees & Applicants: What You Can Expect After You File a Charge, EEOC, https://
www.eeoc.gov/employees/process.cfm (last visited Nov. 30, 2018).
79 Id.
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tion, if the EEOC does not determine that there was harassment or
discrimination in violation of Title VII, they will provide the employee a
“notice of right to sue.”80  This notice is required before a suit can be filed in
court.81  Where the EEOC determines that a violation occurred, the Agency
will attempt to reach a settlement with the employer.82  If no settlement can
be reached, the Agency will determine whether the EEOC or the Department
of Justice should file a lawsuit against the employer.  Should the EEOC
decline to file a suit at this point, the employee receives notice, giving them
the right to initiate a suit in court.83  The EEOC received nearly 30,000
charges containing an allegation of workplace harassment in 2015 alone.84
A. The Congressional Accountability Act of 1995: What It Meant for
Congressional Employees Experiencing Sexual Harassment or Discrimination
The idea that the rulemakers must themselves be bound by the rules
they make is a central tenet of any democratic republic.85  This traditional
principle has been instilled in American society ever since the founding
era,86 and Americans continue to carry with them a strong sense that no one





84 Preventing Sexual Harassment Hearing, supra note 37, at 8 (statement of Victoria A.
Lipnic, Acting Chair, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).
85 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 379 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1967) (1690); Andrew Lintott, Aristotle and Democracy, 42 CLASSICAL Q. 114, 122
(1992) (referencing a number of Aristotle’s works); see also Charles Grassley & Jennifer
Shaw Schmidt, Essay, Practicing What We Preach: A Legislative History of Congressional Accounta-
bility, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 33, 35 (1998) (“This is a democracy, and therefore, we make
laws for the people, and we, too, must follow these laws.”).
86 THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 352–53 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)(“I
will add, as a fifth circumstance in the situation of the House of Representatives,
restraining them from oppressive measures, that they can make no law which will not have
its full operation on themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of the soci-
ety.  This has always been deemed one of the strongest bonds by which human policy can
connect the rulers and the people together.  It creates between them that communion of
interests and sympathy of sentiments, of which few governments have furnished examples;
but without which every government degenerates into tyranny.  If it be asked, what is to
restrain the House of Representatives from making legal discriminations in favor of them-
selves and a particular class of the society?  I answer: the genius of the whole system; the
nature of just and constitutional laws; and above all, the vigilant and manly spirit which
actuates the people of America, a spirit which nourishes freedom, and in return is nour-
ished by it.  If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not obligatory on
the legislature, as well as on the people, the people will be prepared to tolerate any thing
but liberty.  Such will be the relation between the House of Representatives and their
constituents.”).
87 See Gerald D. Skoning, Opinion, How Congress Puts Itself Above the Law, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 15, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732450470457841318281
4140480.
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exempted itself from the laws it makes to govern either the public, the execu-
tive branch, or both.88  During the early 1990s, this tendency encountered
heightened criticism,89 which culminated in the passing of the Congressional
Accountability Act of 1995 (“CAA”).90  The CAA was the very first law passed
by the 104th Congress and was seen as a “long overdue restoration of the
Framers’ intent that Congress should apply to itself the laws it prescribes for
the people.”91
The CAA originally made eleven different federal civil rights and
employment laws applicable to Congress and its various support organiza-
tions.92  Of particular relevance for discussing sex discrimination and harass-
ment is the application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.93  The
CAA also established the Office of Compliance (OOC) to serve as an inde-
pendent legislative office charged with executing the CAA.94  The OOC
includes a Board of Directors, which consists of five individuals jointly
appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Majority
Leader of the Senate, and the Minority Leaders of both the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate.95  The CAA provides for appointment of various
other positions, including an Executive Director, Deputy Executive Directors,
General Counsel, and other staff by either the Chair or the Executive Direc-
tor.96  In 2017, the OOC was comprised of approximately twenty individuals,
not including the five members of the Board of Directors.97
The heart of the CAA is the administrative and judicial dispute resolu-
tion procedures it established through which the laws made applicable to
Congress were to be enforced.  Until the Reform Act, these procedures pro-
vided the sole means by which any congressional employee could bring a
claim under the applicable federal laws against an employing office—includ-
ing a claim of workplace sex discrimination or harassment under Title VII.98
88 See Harold H. Bruff, That the Laws Shall Bind Equally on All: Congressional and Execu-
tive Roles in Applying Laws to Congress, 48 ARK. L. REV. 105, 106, 112 (1995).  Congress con-
tinues to exempt itself from various laws. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(A) (2012); see also
Skoning, supra note 87.
89 Bruff, supra note 88, at 107.
90 Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered titles of the
U.S. Code).
91 James J. Brudney, Congressional Accountability and Denial: Speech or Debate Clause and
Conflict of Interest Challenges to Unionization of Congressional Employees, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1,
1–2 (1999).  Two senators even quoted portions of The Federalist No. 57 during floor debate.
Id. at 2 n.4.
92 Grassley & Schmidt, supra note 85, at 35.  Two additional laws have since been
added to those applied to Congress via the CAA. U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE, CON-
GRESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1995, at iii (2016).
93 2 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(2) (2012).
94 Id. § 1381.
95 Id. § 1381(b).
96 Id. § 1382.
97 See Preventing Sexual Harassment Hearing, supra note 37, at 18 (statement of Susan
Tsui Grundmann, Executive Director, Congressional Office of Compliance).
98 2 U.S.C. § 1401.
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To initiate a claim with the OOC, an employee was required to request coun-
seling within 180 days of the alleged violation.99  The counseling period
lasted thirty days unless the employee and the OOC agreed to reduce the
time period.100  During the counseling period, the OOC provided the
employee with “all relevant information with respect to the rights of the
employee.”101  To move forward with a claim after counseling, an employee
had fifteen days from the conclusion of the counseling period to request that
the OOC initiate mediation.102  Mediation consisted of meetings, either
jointly or separately, between an OOC-appointed mediator, the employee,
and the employing office.103  The mediation period lasted for thirty days
unless an extension was jointly requested by both parties.104  All mediation
was deemed “strictly confidential” with the threat of sanctions against anyone
who violated this confidentiality.105
If a dispute was not resolved during the mediation process, the
employee was required to wait an additional thirty days after the mediation
period before taking any further action.106  This became known as the “cool-
ing off period.”107  After the cooling off period, the employee had sixty days
to proceed in one of two ways: the employee could file an administrative
complaint with the OOC or file a civil action in federal court.108  If an
employee elected to proceed through an administrative complaint, the OOC
appointed a hearing officer who had the authority to dismiss claims deemed
frivolous prior to a hearing or to conduct a confidential hearing for claims
not dismissed and to issue a decision as to whether a violation occurred in
those cases.109  Either the employee or the employing office could appeal the
decision of the hearing officer to the Board of Directors within thirty days of
99 Id. § 1402(a).
100 Id.
101 Id.  “Counseling” for the purposes of the CAA should not be confused with what
people often think of as psychological or other professional counseling to resolve personal
issues.  The counseling period would be more aptly thought of as an informative period in
which the OOC intends to provide the employee with all the information necessary for
deciding how to proceed.
102 Id. § 1403.  If an employee does not request a mediation period, they are not per-
mitted to pursue either of the remedial processes available under the CAA: filing an
administrative complaint with the OOC or filing a civil action in federal court. Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. § 1416.
106 Id. § 1404.
107 Rachael Bade & Elana Schor, Capitol Hill’s Sexual Harassment Policy ‘Toothless,’ ‘a Joke,’
POLITICO (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/27/capitol-hill-sexual-
harassment-policies-victims-244224; Clio Chang, Congress Has Its Own Sexual Harassment
Problem, SPLINTER (Oct. 25, 2017), https://splinternews.com/congress-has-its-own-sexual-
harassment-problem-1819779198.
108 2 U.S.C. § 1404.
109 Id. § 1405.
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entry of the decision by the officer.110  A final decision by the Board was
appealable exclusively to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
and a petition for review to initiate that appeal had to be filed within ninety
days of the Board’s decision.111  An employee who chose to forgo any admin-
istrative proceedings upon completion of the cooling off period could
instead file a civil complaint in federal district court.112  Throughout the
entire process under the CAA, the employing office received representation
from the Office of House Employment Counsel or the Office of Senate Chief
Counsel for Employment (depending on which house the office was a part
of) in addition to any private representation obtained by the individual
whose conduct was being investigated.113  Meanwhile, the OOC provided
counseling to the employee but did not serve as counsel; in fact, employees
were provided no counsel or representation, not even throughout the first
three stages of the administrative process, despite these periods being
mandatory steps that, if not taken, barred an employee from seeking admin-
istrative or civil remedy.114
Any settlement reached prior to the cooling off period or throughout
the administrative procedure required approval by the OOC Executive Direc-
tor in order to be implemented.115  Further, any settlements or awards issued
pursuant to the CAA were paid from a fund appropriated to the U.S. Trea-
sury, not from the funds of any individual employing office or member of
Congress.116  The funds paid out of this account for any settlement or award
on a claim against a member of Congress were not reimbursed by those
members, and there was no required public reporting connecting any such
payments to the particular employing office responsible for the payout.  The
public had no way to obtain information on the amount of public funds
being paid out by particular employing offices, nor information on which
offices resolved any claims via settlements.
In 1995 the CAA constituted significant progress when compared to a
total congressional exemption from the purview of Title VII.117  However, it
110 Id. § 1406.  The Board does not review decisions of hearing officers de novo, but
instead will only set aside the decision if it was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not consistent with law or the required procedures, or unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence. Id.
111 Id. § 1407.  Similarly, the Federal Circuit does not review decisions of the Board de
novo; the court uses the same standard as the Board uses in its review of hearing officers.
Id.
112 Id. § 1408.
113 Preventing Sexual Harassment in the Congressional Workplace: Hearing Before the Comm. on
H. Admin., 115th Cong. 1–2 (2017) (written testimony of Gloria J. Lett, Counsel, Office of
House Employment Counsel).
114 Id.
115 2 U.S.C. § 1414.
116 Id. § 1415.
117 See Bruff, supra note 88, at 157; Grassley & Schmidt, supra note 85, at 34; James T.
O’Reilly, Collision in the Congress: Congressional Accountability, Workplace Conflict, and the Sepa-
ration of Powers, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 8 (1996).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL511.txt unknown Seq: 18  1-JUL-19 14:01
2176 notre dame law review [vol. 94:5
seems that those who believed that the CAA would truly construct a system of
accountability for congressional sexual harassment and discrimination likely
found themselves severely disappointed by the CAA when looking back
through the lens of awareness brought about by the ‘me too’ Movement.
Rather than create accountability, the CAA constructed a structure that
allowed the accused to hide behind procedural shadows and failed to provide
true accountability to victims or the public at large.
IV. TIME’S UP FOR CONGRESS118:
 CONGRESS’S RESPONSE IN THE WAKE OF ‘ME TOO’
“Congress has been quick to respond forcefully when harassment
becomes an issue in both the public and private sectors. . . . But putting its
own house in order has been a different story . . . .”119  Even after the ‘me
too’ Movement facilitated a heightened awareness that Congress suffers from
a “[s]exual [h]arassment [p]roblem,”120 it took over a year before the coun-
try received any substantial progress.
Quick on the heels of the Movement’s rise, each house passed their own
simple resolutions requiring antiharassment training for members of the
House and Senate and their staff.121  The House resolution also requires
each of its offices to post notice of the rights and protections afforded to
employees.122  The most promising part of these resolutions was the speed
with which the houses acted: the House resolution was introduced on
November 28, 2017, and passed a day later; the Senate resolution was intro-
duced and passed on November 9, 2017.123  Such rapid response indicated
Congress’s recognition that action was needed, and that it was needed
118 TIME’S UP, https://www.timesupnow.com/home (last visited Nov. 20, 2018).
TIME’S UP is an organization that works with advocates to address workplace inequality,
because, in their words: “The clock has run out on sexual assault, harassment and
inequality in the workplace.  It’s time to do something about it.” Id.
119 Bacon, supra note 21.
120 Chang, supra note 107; Lee et al., supra note 9.
121 H.R. Res. 630, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); S. Res. 330, 115th Cong. (2017)
(enacted).  It is worth noting that the OOC has been recommending a mandatory training
requirement to Congress since 1996.  Bacon, supra note 21.  Various annual reports by the
OOC contain this express recommendation of a mandatory training requirement. See, e.g.,
2016 STATE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL WORKPLACE, supra note 29, at 25; 2014 STATE OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL WORKPLACE, supra note 29, at 30; U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE,
FY2012 ANNUAL REPORT: STATE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL WORKPLACE 35 (2012).  Despite the
annual recommendation, and the past efforts of various members of Congress to pass legis-
lation requiring such training, these 2017 resolutions were the first implementation of any
requirement of antiharassment training within the legislature. See Bade & Schor, supra
note 107.
122 H.R. Res. 630.
123 H. Res. 630: Actions Overview, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/house-resolution/630/actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22h.res+630%
22%5D%7D (last visited Nov. 30, 2018); S. Res. 330: Actions Overview, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-resolution/330/actions?q=%7B
%22search%22%3A%5B%22s.®es.+330%22%5D%7D&r=1 (last visited Nov. 30, 2018).
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quickly.  However, these simple resolutions amounted to little in the grand
scheme of expected reform for a few reasons.  First, simple resolutions do not
have the force of law.124  They are nonbinding and provide for no clear
repercussions if the congressional offices fail to comply.125  Second, these
resolutions only apply to the offices within the House and Senate—they
impose no requirements on other departments and support agencies that fall
under the legislative branch: the Library of Congress (which includes the
Congressional Research Service), the Capitol Police, the Architect of the
Capitol, the Congressional Budget Office, and the General Accountability
Office.126  And finally, the training requirement itself did nothing to modify
the archaic administrative process required to bring a claim under the CAA.
So, while the training requirements were a step in the right direction, the
resolutions exclude many congressional employees from any protection they
may offer, and whether they offer much protection at all is questionable
absent any clear enforcement mechanism.
The House passed a second simple resolution several months later, on
February 6, 2018.127  This resolution requires each House office to adopt
internal antiharassment and antidiscrimination policies and—perhaps most
importantly—established the House Office of Employee Advocacy to
“provid[e] legal assistance and consultation to covered employees of the
House under the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 regarding the
procedures of such Act . . . .”128  This means that House employees now have
access to legal representation for any claim brought through the administra-
tive processes; the assistance and representation does not extend to employ-
ees who pursue a claim by filing a civil action and does not cover legislative
employees employed outside of the House.129  This legislation is subject to
124 See Legislative Process: Legislation, Laws, and Acts, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.
gov/legislative/common/briefing/leg_laws_acts.htm#4 (last visited Nov. 30, 2018); The
Legislative Process: Bills & Resolutions, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://
www.house.gov/the-house-explained/the-legislative-process/bills-resolutions (last visited
Nov. 30, 2018).
125 The House resolution does provide that “[t]he Committee on House Administra-
tion shall consider additional mechanisms to ensure compliance with the training require-
ment.”  H.R. Res. 630, § 1(e).  Meanwhile, the Senate resolution provides for a process by
which the Secretary of the Senate will publish a list of offices that have certified completion
of the training on the public website thirty days after the first day of each Congress.  S. Res.
330, § 5.  Neither of these, in and of themselves, provides for any punitive actions that can
be taken against noncompliant offices.
126 H.R. Res. 630 specifically applies to “each Member . . . , officer, and employee of the
House of Representatives.”  H.R. Res. 630, § 1(a)(1).  The resolution further specifies that
“employee” does include interns, fellows, and detailees from other government offices
while serving in a House office. Id. § 1(a)(2).  Likewise, the Senate resolution mandates
training for “[s]enators and officers, employees, and interns of, and detailees to the Sen-
ate.”  S. Res. 330.
127 H.R. Res. 724, 115th Cong. (2018) (enacted).  This is the same day on which the
House passed its most notable bill to reform the CAA as a whole. See infra note 131.
128 H.R. Res. 724.
129 Id. § 2(b)–(c).
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the above-noted limitations of simple resolutions—however, it is a significant
piece of legislation, as it is the first that extends any legal representation to
congressional employees bringing claims of sexual harassment or discrimina-
tion.  The ramifications of this resolution will be further highlighted below
when discussing their relation to the Reform Act as a whole.
Beyond the resolutions, a number of bills to formally amend the CAA or
individual components of it were proposed in both houses in response to the
‘me too’ Movement.130  Only two of these many bills gained any traction
after they were introduced: House Bill 4924, which passed the House just one
day after it was introduced on February 5, 2018,131 and Senate Bill 2952,
which passed the Senate the same day it was introduced on May 24, 2018.132
In the months that followed, both bills sat before the opposite houses await-
ing further action while negotiations between the houses were reportedly tak-
ing place without much success.133  The struggle to obtain a compromise
between the two bills resulted from the several significant ways in which they
differed.134  Victim-focused advocates tried to exact pressure on the House to
130 Proposed bills that were referred to committee within the respective houses but
otherwise made no progress in advancing through committee include the following: S.
3453, 115th Cong. (2018); S. 2872, 115th Cong. (2018); S. 2401, 115th Cong. (2018); H.R.
4822, 115th Cong. (2018); H.R. 4690, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 2236, 115th Cong. (2017);
H.R. 4615, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 4540, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 4522, 115th Cong.
(2017); H.R. 4503, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 4497, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 4494, 115th
Cong. (2017); H.R. 4484, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 4481, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 4458,
115th Cong. (2017); S. 2159, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 4396, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R.
4393, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 4195, 115th Cong. (2017); and H.R. 4155, 115th Cong.
(2017).  Information on these bills regarding their date of introduction, referral to particu-
lar committees, and lack of subsequent progress can be found using the congressional
legislation tracker on https://www.congress.gov/.
131 Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 Reform Act, H.R. 4924, 115th Cong.
(2018); H.R. 4924: Actions Overview, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/house-bill/4924/actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22H.R%3E+4924%
22%5D%7D&r=1 (last visited Nov. 30, 2018).
132 Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 Reform Act, S. 2952, 115th Cong. (2018);
S. 2952: Actions Overview, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/
senate-bill/2952/actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22S.+2952%22%5D%7D&r=1
(last visited Nov. 30, 2018).
133 See Caldwell, supra note 12; Garza, supra note 12; Elana Schor & Heather Caygle,
Congress Dawdles as #MeToo Scandals Rage On, POLITICO (Aug. 11, 2018), https://
www.politico.com/story/2018/08/11/congress-sexual-harassment-metoo-scandals-773309;
Sunlen Serfaty, Capitol Hill’s Sexual Harassment Bill Fight Not Expected to Be Resolved Before
Election Day, CNN (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/12/politics/sexual-
harassment-legislation/index.html; Sunlen Serfaty & Clare Floran, ‘Time Is Running Out’:
Former Hill Staffers Urge Congress to Pass Stalled Sexual Harassment Legislation, CNN (Nov. 13,
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/13/politics/congress-metoo-sexual-harassment-leg
islation/index.html.
134 Kelsey Snell, Time Is Running Short for Congress’ Sexual Harassment Bill, NPR (Dec. 10,
2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/10/675382699/lawmakers-hope-to-reach-compro-
mise-on-overhaul-of-sexual-harassment-claims-syste (“The chambers struggled to resolve
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stand by what they considered to be its much stronger proposal.135  As time
continued to pass with little to no evidence of progress, it became increas-
ingly concerning that the differences between the bills might prevent the
passage of a reform bill altogether.136  However, less than a month before the
end of the congressional session, a new bill was introduced in the Senate:
Senate Bill 3749.137  The bill passed both houses the same day it was intro-
duced.138  Senate Bill 3749 was presented to the President a week later, and
on December 21, 2018, President Trump signed into law the Congressional
Accountability Act of 1995 Reform Act (“Reform Act”).139  The significant
substance of the new law and whether it was worth the wait is the subject of
the following three Sections.
A. Ground Zero: The Reform Act’s Predecessors
The two bills that passed their respective houses during the early wave of
reform efforts—House Bill 4924 and Senate Bill 2952—comprised the funda-
mental building blocks for Senate Bill 3749.  Not only did the two original
bills contain a number of provisions that were identical or nearly identical to
one another, but some of those same provisions also constitute parts of the
compromise represented by the Reform Act.  As such, it is worth addressing
some of these provisions as well as some of the major differences between
House Bill 4924 and Senate Bill 2952 that caused the months of negotiation
preceding the Reform Act.
Certain elements that were consistent across both the House and Senate
bills and are now enshrined in the Reform Act.  These include provisions
renaming the Office of Compliance to the Office of Congressional Work-
place Rights (“Office”)140 and extending protection to interns, fellows, and
detailees—none of whom were covered by the CAA.141  Also present in both
bills and now in the Reform Act is the new possibility of alternative work
arrangements for the aggrieved employee throughout the course of proceed-
major issues like who will pay for future settlements with accusers, who should conduct the
investigations and how much information should be made public.”).
135 Schor & Caygle, supra note 133.
136 See Sunlen Serfaty, Ethics Committee Urges Congress to Pass Long-Stalled Sexual Harass-
ment Legislation, CNN (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/20/politics/sexual-
harassment-legislation-congress/index.html; Snell, supra note 134.
137 Elise Viebeck, Congress Sends Trump Bill to Make Lawmakers Liable for Harassment Settle-
ments, WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/con
gress-sends-trump-bill-to-make-lawmakers-liable-for-harassment-settlements/2018/12/13/
cbcdc5fc-fef6-11e8-83c0-b06139e540e5_story.html?noredirect=ON&utm_term=.913949c46
645; S. 3749: Actions Overview, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-con
gress/senate-bill/3749/actions (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
138 S. 3749: Actions Overview, supra note 137.
139 Pub. L. No. 115-397, 132 Stat. 5297 (2018) (to be codified in scattered sections of 2
U.S.C.).
140 S. 3749, 115th Cong. § 308 (2018) (enacted); S. 2952, 115th Cong. § 308 (2018);
H.R. 4924, 115th Cong. § 305 (2018).
141 S. 3749, § 302; S. 2952, § 302; H.R. 4924, § 301.
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ings; the provision specifically provides that these accommodations can be
requested by the employee but the employing office is not required to permit
remote work, a paid leave of absence, or other workplace adjustments.142
Further, the Reform Act preserved from both bills a host of administrative,
reporting, and educational requirements, including the following: (1) that
any claim of a violation perpetrated by a member or by senior staff of an
employing office that results in an award, settlement, or a final disposition
must be referred to the ethics committee of the respective house;143 (2) that
the Office implement a record retention policy and conduct a climate survey
every two years;144 and (3) that all employing offices not covered by the
existing resolutions provide training and education programs for their
employees.145  The Reform Act also carried through an important reporting
requirement from the bills requiring the Office to publish annual reports of
any payouts made; the reports must indicate the employing office involved,
the amount of the payment, the provision violated, and—where the violation
was perpetrated by a member or former member—whether the member is in
compliance with the reimbursement requirements.146  This reporting
requirement is partially retroactive; while the Reform Act provides that the
Office must issue a report on all past payments made using public funds, it
specifically bans the report from identifying any particular congressional
office connected with those payouts.147
Despite these similarities shared by the original bills and preserved in
the Reform Act, several key differences distinguished the House and Senate
bills from one another.  These differences provide important context for
understanding the compromise represented by the Reform Act.  First, the
House bill was the only one of the proposals in which there were no counsel-
ing or mediation requirements as part of the administrative procedure,
doing away with two stages that were mandatory under the CAA and were
highly criticized when the process came into the public spotlight following
142 See S. 3749, § 113 (“At the request of a covered employee who files a claim . . . the
employing office may permit the covered employee to carry out the employee’s responsibil-
ities from a remote location . . . . If, in the determination of the covered employee’s
employing office, a covered employee who makes a request . . . cannot carry out the
employee’s responsibilities from a remote location . . . the employing office may . . . grant a
paid leave of absence . . . or . . . make another workplace adjustment . . . .” (emphasis
added)); see also S. 2952, § 113; H.R. 4924, § 113.
143 S. 3749, § 112; S. 2952, § 112; H.R. 4924, § 112.
144 S. 3749, §§ 202–203; S. 2952, §§ 202–203; H.R. 4924, §§ 202–203.
145 S. 3749, § 306; S. 2952, § 306; H.R. 4924, § 304.  “Employing office” includes the
Office of Congressional Accessibility Services, the United States Capitol Police, the Con-
gressional Budget Office, the Office of the Architect of the Capitol, the Office of the
Attending Physician, the Office of Compliance, and the Office of Technology Assessment.
2 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012) (definition not amended by the Reform Act).  The offices of the
House and Senate are specifically excluded from this provision.  S. 3749, § 306.  This
exemption is presumably because the passage of each houses’ respective resolutions was
deemed sufficient to enforce this requirement against the House and Senate.
146 S. 3749, § 201; S. 2952, § 201; H.R. 4924, § 201.
147 S. 3749, § 201.
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the ‘me too’ Movement.148  The original Senate Bill 2952 did away with a
counseling period but left mediation as a required default; mediation would
be implemented unless either party opted out within ten business days from
the date the claim was filed.149  On this issue, the Reform Act reflects the
House bill in eliminating both mandated stages altogether; neither are
needed in order to proceed with a claim.150
With respect to another significant component of House Bill 4924, how-
ever, the Reform Act did not preserve the House’s proposal: providing for a
new, automatic independent investigation to be completed at the beginning
of the complaint process.  Under House Bill 4924, the filing of a claim by an
employee would have triggered an investigation by the Office in which it
would have the power to issue subpoenas and carry out discovery to evaluate
the claims; this investigatory power would have given the OOC authority
much more similar to that of the EEOC.151  Upon completion of this investi-
gation, the House bill would have required the Office to provide a report
indicating a finding of either (1) reasonable cause to believe a violation
occurred, (2) no reasonable cause to believe a violation occurred, or (3) an
inability to determine whether or not there was reasonable cause to believe a
violation occurred.152  A finding of no reasonable cause would have given the
employee the right to file a civil action.153  Where the finding was one of
reasonable cause or an inability to determine whether there was reasonable
cause, a formal hearing would have been conducted.154  The Reform Act
does not contain any such investigative component.  Instead, the Reform Act
more closely aligns with the Senate’s proposal in the original Senate Bill 2952
with regard to the administrative process.  The Senate’s original bill provided
for a formal hearing only if requested by the employee, which had to be done
within ninety days of either the end of mediation or the date on which a
party opted out of mediation.155  Where an employee opted out of mediation
but failed to timely request a formal hearing, they presumably had no other
option of resolving the claim other than filing a civil action in court.
Another central difference between the bills was that Senate Bill 2952
included a new provision in which a confidential advisor would be appointed
to employees in order to inform them of their rights, to consult with them
regarding the responsibilities of the Office, and to discuss the relative merits
148 Lee & Viebeck, supra note 54; Letter from 1500 Former Congressional Staff, supra
note 9 (expressing concern that the “excessive” waiting periods imposed under the CAA
might “actually discourage victims” from coming forward); Letter Regarding Harassment,
Discrimination, and Reform in Congress, supra note 47 (describing the dispute resolution
process under the CAA as “antiquated, unfair, and traumatizing”).
149 S. 2952, § 103.
150 S. 3749, §§ 101–102.
151 H.R. 4924, § 103; see also Employees & Applicants: What You Can Expect After You File a
Charge, supra note 78.
152 H.R. 4924, § 103.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 S. 2952, 115th Cong. § 104 (2018).
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of securing private counsel, designating a nonattorney representative, or pro-
ceeding without representation.156  However, the confidential advisor would
not have been permitted to “provide legal advice to, or act as the designated
representative for” employees.157  This provision was preserved in the com-
promise of the Reform Act, but it only applies to allegations involving Senate
employing offices, because the House provides for full legal representation to
House employees through its previously passed resolution.158
Finally, the bills differed significantly in the member reimbursement
requirements they provided.  While each did provide for reimbursement of
funds paid out for claims brought against a member, the Senate’s bill pro-
vided for greater protection of members against this liability through several
limitations on the requirement.159  These limitations were largely incorpo-
rated into the Reform Act and will be detailed further in the following
subsection.
B. Senate Bill 3749: What Does the Reform Act
Mean for Congressional Staff?
The compromise of Senate Bill 3749 has been met with praise for the
simple fact that it significantly improves the antiquated process that the CAA
required.160  After exploring the major elements of the law in this subsec-
tion, however, the final subsection of this Note will outline why it is an over-
statement to consider the Reform Act a true triumph.
Under the Reform Act, an aggrieved employee has the same 180 days to
file a claim as under the original CAA.161  Upon filing a claim, there is no
mandatory counseling stage for the employee.  The Reform Act requires the
Office to intake the claim, notify the employing office, and, where the viola-
tion is alleged against a member of Congress, give notice of the possibility
that the individual may be required to provide reimbursement for any award
or settlement that results.162  Unlike the House’s original bill, there is no
initial investigation of the claim.  Instead, the Reform Act provides for a “pre-
liminary review” by a hearing officer designated by the Office.163  This review
does not seem to give the Office full investigatory power over the claim—it
156 Id. § 204.
157 Id.
158 H.R. Res. 724, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018) (enacted).
159 S. 2952, § 111; H.R. 4924, § 111.
160 See Statement from Congress Too and the Purple Campaign on Passage of Sexual Harassment
Reform Bill, CONGRESS TOO (Dec. 2018), https://www.congresstoo.org/bill-passage-state
ment; see also Ariel E. Solomon, #MeToo Legislation: Did Congress Just Put Its Money Where Its
Mouth Is?, N.Y. L.J. (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/01/
16/metoo-legislation-did-congress-just-put-its-money-where-its-mouth-is/; Zhou, supra note
14.
161 Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 115-397, § 102,
132 Stat. 5297, 5301 (2018) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1402).
162 Id.
163 Id. § 103.
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requires the hearing officer to assess only whether the basic claim criteria are
met: whether the claimant is a covered employee, whether the office involved
is an employing office under the Reform Act, and whether the individual has
met all the necessary filing deadlines.  The review must also identify the
potential for settlement, the relief sought by the claimant, and the factual
and legal issues involved in the claim; however, the review does not require
any collection or assessment of evidence or testimony in order to investigate
the identified issues.164  The hearing officer provides a report based on the
preliminary review to both the employee and the employing office.  From
there, it is up to the employee to request a formal hearing if they so desire—
an employee has only ten days from the date that the preliminary review
report is released to make such request.165  Any formal hearing that does
occur proceeds under the same method as under the original CAA; the
Reform Act did not amend the formal hearing process itself.
The Reform Act also does away with any required mediation period,
including the opt-out provision from the Senate’s original bill.  However, the
Reform Act does provide for mediation when either party requests it and the
other party agrees.166  The refusal of a party to engage in mediation is specifi-
cally banned from being considered during any later procedures under the
Reform Act.167  Once an employee makes it past the preliminary review, it
seems the only options for resolving the claim are to request a formal hearing
within the ten-day period, to request mediation, or to file a civil action.
Employees may only file a civil action when they timely filed a claim with the
Office but have not submitted a request for a formal hearing; filing a civil
action terminates any further administrative procedures under the Office.168
An additional feat of the Reform Act is its reimbursement require-
ment.169  However, the triumph is lessened by several extra protections
afforded to members of Congress that were not part of the House’s original
proposal; rather, these protections largely came from Senate Bill 2952.  The
Reform Act provides for reimbursement of compensatory damages resulting
from violations committed by a member for any award or settlement con-
nected with a claim.170  There are, however, significant limitations on the
164 Id.
165 Id.  Where the hearing officer determines that the employee has not stated a claim
for which relief can be granted, they become ineligible for a formal hearing under the
administrative procedure.  Instead, the employee is left only with the option of filing a civil
claim. Id.  It does not appear that there is any process through which an employee can
appeal or challenge a hearing officer’s preliminary review conclusion.
166 Id. § 104.
167 Id.
168 Id. § 101.  The employee must file a civil action within seventy days of having filed a
claim with the Office. Id.
169 “Reimbursement” means that any funds awarded to a claimant or given through a
settlement agreement are still dispersed from the Treasury and then the member of Con-
gress is required to pay back the Treasury for that payment.  This is likely done so as not to
delay receipt of payment by the claimant. See Viebeck, supra note 137.
170 Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 Reform Act § 111.
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applicability of this requirement.  First, reimbursement is only required for
an award if there is a separate finding by the hearing officer or the court that,
not only did the violation occur, but that the violation was committed person-
ally by the member.171  Second, reimbursement is only required for the
amount of compensatory damages awarded, not for funds dispersed to cover
a claimant’s award for anything further, such as attorneys’ fees or costs.172
Third, the award is subject to a $300,000 cap.173  Finally, reimbursement is
only required for harassment violations—the Act does not require reimburse-
ment for other sex-based discrimination.174  Regarding funds dispersed in
connection with a settlement agreement—as opposed to an award—there is
an additional limitation under which funds may not be reimbursed to the
Treasury fund: for any settlement agreement involving a violation by a sena-
tor, reimbursement by that senator will not be required unless the Senate
Select Committee on Ethics through its own investigation of the claim that an
actual violation occurred.175  If the Committee does not determine that an
actual violation occurred, it seems that the senator is not responsible for
reimbursing the Treasury for money dispersed pursuant to that settlement
agreement.
A final significant change incorporated in the Reform Act is the confi-
dential advisor provision proposed in the Senate’s original bill.176  This provi-
sion is meant to balance the unequal footing of employees as compared to
employing offices, which are provided legal representation for any claim
brought against them.  However, the Reform Act specifically prohibits the
advisor from acting as a designated representative for any covered
employee.177  The advisor is allowed to inform the employee about their
rights and assist the employee in understanding the procedures available to
them and the significance of those procedures.  Moreover, the advisor may
consult with the employee regarding the relative merits of securing private
counsel, designating a nonattorney representative, or proceeding without
representation.  The advisor may also advise and consult with the employee
about the factual allegations that support the employee’s claim and the rela-
171 Id.
172 Attorneys’ fees and costs may be awarded to prevailing plaintiffs in claims.  Punitive
damages cannot be awarded.  2 U.S.C. § 1361(c) (2012).  This provision of the original
CAA was not amended by the Reform Act.
173 Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 Reform Act § 111.  This is done by lan-
guage in the Reform Act that limits the reimbursement requirement to compensatory dam-
ages “as would be available if awarded under section 1977A(b)(3) of the Revised Statutes
(42 U.S.C. 1981a(b)(3)).”  The text of the Reform Act itself does not specify the monetary
cap.  Id.
174 Id.  The Reform Act does provide for reimbursement for “intimidation, reprisal, or
discrimination” but only where it is taken as a retaliatory measure against an employee who
first files a claim alleging a harassment violation. Id.
175 Id. § 112.
176 Id. § 204.
177 Id.
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tive merits of the procedural options available to the employee.178  The
employee must request to be assigned a confidential advisor within 180 days
from the date of the violation.
C. Accountability: Does the Reform Act Live Up to Congress’s Promise to Victims
and the Public?
The Reform Act represents vast improvement for congressional employ-
ees in very real and significant ways.  But the Reform Act also fails to follow
through on the promise of “accountability” for both aggrieved employees
and the public at large.
First, the “preliminary review” process is a sadly diluted remnant of the
investigatory procedure proposed in the House’s original bill.  The House
bill crafted a congressional procedure to investigate claims in a manner
much more similar to those experienced by employees within the executive
branch and the private sector when bringing a claim to the EEOC.  The
absence of a real investigation to collect and consider statements and evi-
dence while it is most readily available is a disservice to employees.  Addition-
ally, it seems possible that the bare-bones preliminary review—as opposed to
a thorough initial investigation—risks communicating to employees that
their claims are not being taken seriously.  The preliminary review requires
very little actual review.  Then, once the report is complete, an employee
found to have satisfied the criteria has only ten days to decide how to pro-
ceed with the case.  Failing to request a formal hearing within those ten days
means that the employee’s only options to resolve the claim are to request
mediation or to file a civil suit; for employees unable to afford representation
in court, this seems as though it might force them into mediation—a result
deemed antiquated under the original CAA.  Obviously, there must be cer-
tain deadlines by which employees need to decide the next steps in pursuing
their claim, but a ten-day period to weigh the important decision as to how to
proceed in a sensitive claim—one that is not only deeply personal but also
significantly impactful on one’s career—seems an unnecessarily short win-
dow that fails to account for the weight of the decision.179
Second, the Reform Act does not deliver as much as promised when it
comes to requiring reimbursement for payments related to claims against
members of Congress themselves.  It is not entirely clear how a hearing
officer or court would find in favor of an employee in a claim against a mem-
ber without also finding that the member committed the violation alleged,
and yet the Reform Act only requires reimbursement by members when
there is separate finding of responsibility beyond what is needed in claims
against those who are not members of Congress.  It is too early to tell if this
additional hurdle will serve to protect members from reimbursement
requirements, but it nonetheless speaks to the begrudging way that the Sen-
178 Id.
179 Even the Senate’s original bill provided for a ninety-day window in which an
employee could request a formal hearing.  S. 2952, 115th Cong. § 104 (2018).
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ate views financial accountability for member misconduct; this provision
requiring a separate finding was not part of the House’s original bill.  Addi-
tionally, the Act incorporates other financial protections that seem out of
place in an “accountability” law: both the provisions that members need only
reimburse compensatory damages and that the reimbursement has a maxi-
mum cap signify that members will accept financial accountability only to a
certain degree.  Perhaps one of the most egregious protections reserved for
senators alone is the provision requiring reimbursement for settlement pay-
ments only when the Senate Select Committee on Ethics makes its own find-
ing that a senator personally committed an actual violation.  This means that
a senator who enters a settlement agreement with an employee may escape
financial accountability and once again pass the burden for their misconduct
on to the public if the ethics committee does not make a finding that a viola-
tion occurred.  This provision is even more concerning if resolution of these
claims tracks the pattern of resolution within the legal field as a whole: with
resolution predominately occurring through settlement agreements.  The
Reform Act fails to ensure that elected officials cannot escape repaying the
public in full for damages paid in response to their own misconduct.
A third aspect of the Reform Act that fails to secure true accountability
for aggrieved employees is the inadequate compromise of providing employ-
ees a “confidential advisor” instead of legal counsel.  The criticism of this
component of the CAA was that it is unfair for employing offices and mem-
bers of Congress to receive government-provided representation while
employees are forced to walk through the process without representation
unless they can afford to hire their own.  Not only does providing a confiden-
tial advisor fail to counter this inequality, but it could also risk that employees
will be rightfully confused by being provided a lawyer to confidentially dis-
cuss the claim with them and to provide legal advice, but somehow not actu-
ally serve as their legal representative.  Further, what might be the most
concerning aspect of this provision is the inconsistent treatment that it pro-
duces.  Recall that the House proved itself to be committed to remedying the
unfairness of the CAA for its employees when it passed the resolution provid-
ing legal representation for House employees during the administrative pro-
ceedings.  The Senate’s unwillingness to provide representation to all
congressional employees in the Reform Act creates an odd disparity in the
rights of congressional staff.  Not only does it leave many congressional
employees without actual legal representation should they come forward with
a claim, but it also generates confusion because the rights of an employee will
depend on their employing office rather than being consistent across all con-
gressional employees.180
Other subtle failures also abound within the Reform Act.  While the
Reform Act requires a disclosure of past payouts for violations, it does not
allow the public to obtain information on which House or Senate offices
180 See Kate Irby, House Aides Will Have More Protection than Senate Aides in Sexual Harass-
ment Bill, MCCLATCHY (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-gov
ernment/congress/article223014250.html.
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were involved in those past payments.181  In fact, it specifically prohibits this
disclosure.182  While it might be appropriate to be sensitive to the notion that
the offices did not contemplate that those settlements and awards would be
made public at the time the claim was resolved, it is quite undemocratic for
elected officials and their staff to claim entitlement to confidentiality when
using public funds to make payments in cases of wrongdoing.  In a demo-
cratic society where representatives are elected, members of the public have a
right to know about such conduct and any related payouts in order to make
informed decisions when casting their vote.  The public interest must out-
weigh any expected secrecy on the part of the offices.183
Finally, the Reform Act is imperfect not just for what it addresses inade-
quately, but also for what it fails to address entirely.  The Reform Act does
not make clear to employees what, if anything, they are permitted to share
publicly regarding their claims.  If mediation does occur, any information
shared during such procedure is confidential.184  Beyond this, however,
employees have no guidance on what they can publicly disclose regarding
their claims.  Additionally, the Reform Act does not address whether nondis-
closure agreements (“NDAs”) can be used or are required in settlement
agreements with legislative employees.  The availability of NDAs means that a
significant number of claims could be resolved without the public having any
knowledge of them—resulting in no accountability.185
The Reform Act should have clarified for employees what they are per-
mitted to disclose and whether an NDA can be requested or even required of
them, and when.  Further, the best practice would be to prohibit NDAs from
being required of or even requested of a victim, and would only allow such
agreements where an aggrieved employee freely requests it.  Employees who
have just made a claim of harassment or discrimination against an employing
office might feel immense pressure to agree to an NDA if asked.  Even if
there is a review process in which a third party tries to assess the voluntariness
of an employee’s agreement to an NDA, the risk that such review might not
entirely prevent involuntary NDAs could be avoided by permitting NDAs only
where the victim makes the request for it.  Permitting NDAs only when it is
181 Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 Reform Act § 201(b)(2).
182 Id. (“Nothing in paragraph (1)(B) may be construed to require or permit the Office
of Congressional Workplace Rights to report the account of any specific office of the
House of Representatives or Senate as the source of funds used for an award or settle-
ment.” (emphasis added)).
183 Some may argue that disclosure of past settlements and awards will inaccurately
inform the public because the settlements in particular do not necessarily represent meri-
torious claims of harassment and discrimination.  This might be true, yet it does not evade
the fact that those congressional offices used public funds to make the payment.  Offices
can make their own defenses of why settlements were paid out, but the public ultimately
has a right to know where their money is going and where it has gone in the past.
184 2 U.S.C. § 1416 (2012).
185 Lauren Greene was forced to sign a nondisclosure agreement as part of the settle-
ment of her claim against former Representative Farenthold.  Bade, supra note 1; Snell,
supra note 134.
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requested by a victim would best serve the interest of the victim by allowing
them to determine the scope of public knowledge of the claim rather than
the employing office.  Even where a nondisclosure agreement is requested by
the victim, the employing office should not be able to make use of such NDA
to evade public reporting requirements.  The lack of clarity regarding confi-
dentiality and NDAs in the Reform Act is concerning with regard to protect-
ing the rights of aggrieved employees and the rights of the public to have
knowledge of misconduct occurring at the hands of its public servants.186
CONCLUSION
In the wake of the ‘me too’ Movement, nearly eighty percent of women
say they are more likely to speak out in the future if they experience sex
discrimination or harassment.187  As a result of the Movement, countless vic-
tims of harassment throughout the country have been emboldened to speak
out, to family, friends, or to the public.  A significant number of congres-
sional staffers specifically called out Congress’s own harassment problem,
which was being exacerbated by an antiquated process that was uniquely
required only of congressional employees.  After persistent pressure from vic-
tims and the public to remedy this “institution-protect[ing] process,”188 Con-
gress passed the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 Reform Act.  The
Reform Act is certainly progress, though it falls short of the reform that many
victims and advocates hoped for—and it certainly fails to rise to the level of
accountability that victims and members of the public deserve.  Only time will
tell if the promises of additional progress will be met.  And only if more
change comes will Congress be able to truly say that it holds itself to a higher
standard.  Until then, the Reform Act will at least make the process of shed-
ding light on sexual harassment and discrimination more bearable for the
brave victims who refuse to stay quiet.
186 Many congressional interns are made to sign NDAs when starting their position.
These documents contain no disclaimer that the NDA does not waive the right to make a
complaint for harassment or discrimination.  That interns will perceive these agreements
as waiving their rights under the Reform Act is just one example of the harm that seems
likely to result from the Reform Act’s silence on this issue.  Rachel Wolfe, Exclusive: Con-
gress Requires Many Unpaid Interns to Sign Nondisclosure Agreements, VOX (Mar. 5, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/2018/3/5/17066728/exclusive-congress-requires-many-unpaid-
interns-to-sign-nondisclosure-agreements.
187 Dann, supra note 2.
188 Lee & Viebeck, supra note 54 (quoting U.S. Representative Jackie Speier).
